

ONLINE APPENDIX

Beliefs about Inequality and the Nature of Support for Redistribution

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A Review of survey experiments

Table A.1: Survey experiments in the context of redistribution and inequality and heterogeneous effects along political ideology

Reference	Beliefs shocked	Effect on support for redistribution		
		Average effect	Left-leaning respondents	Right-leaning respondents
<i>Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso (2018)</i>	Intergenerational mobility	No effect	Positive	No effect
<i>Cruces, Perez-Truglia & Tetaz (2013)</i>	Position (relative) in income distribution	Positive (among those who overestimated their relative income position)	N.A.	N.A.
<i>Fehr, Möllerstrom, Perez-Truglia (2022)</i>	Position in national income distribution Position in global income distribution	No effect No effect	Negative No effect	No effect No effect
<i>Haaland and Roth (2023)</i>	Racial discrimination in hiring	Muted effect	No effect	No effect
<i>Karadja, Möllerstrom, and Seim (2017)</i>	Position (relative) in income distribution	Negative (among those who substantially underestimated their relative income position)	No effect	Negative
<i>Kuziemko et al. (2015)</i>	"Omnibus" treatment: Knowledge of income inequality and the overall economic impact of redistributive policies "Emotional" treatment: Beliefs about the struggle of low-income families	Muted effects on support for redistribution (exception: stronger support for estate taxes) Muted effects	N.A. N.A.	N.A. N.A.
<i>Fenton (2020)</i>	"Policy" treatment: Knowledge of the resources provided to help low-income families	Muted effects (exception: stronger support for minimum wage)	No effect	Positive
<i>Lergetporer, Werner & Woessmann (2020)</i>	Educational inequality	Muted effects	No effect	No effect
<i>Settle (2022)</i>	Gender wage gap	Positive	Positive	No effect

B Background information on experimental tasks, survey measures and population sample

B.1 Details on the measurement of covariates from wave 1

Socio-demographics

We collected information on age, gender, language region, marital status, the highest achieved level of education (compulsory school, vocational training, high school, university, other), occupational status (full time job, part-time job, student, pensioner, currently unemployed, other), whether the individual has experienced unemployment in the past, and municipality of residence.

Belief about own control over success

“People differ in their views regarding why some people get ahead and succeed in life while others do not succeed. Please tell us how important you think each of the factors listed below is for why some people get ahead and succeed in life. For each factor, please give your answer on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means “not at all important” and 10 means “extremely important”. You can choose any number between 0 and 10.” (Source: Fong (2001) and Gallup)

- Willingness to take risks
- Inherited wealth (reverse coded)
- Hard work and initiative
- Luck, being at the right time at the right place (reverse coded)
- Striving for the right education and training

We then create an index by averaging out these five items.

Belief about intergenerational income mobility

“We would like to ask you what you think about the life opportunities of children born in the poorest families in Switzerland. For the following question, we focus on 500 families

that represent all the Swiss families with children. We divide them into five groups on the basis of their income, with each group containing 100 families. These groups are: the richest 100 families, the second richest 100 families, the middle 100 families, the second poorest 100 families, and the poorest 100 families. All these groups are depicted in the figure below, ranked from the richest families to the poorest families. In your opinion, out of 100 children coming from the poorest 100 families, how many will belong to each of the five income groups depicted in the picture below once they become adults? Please fill out the entries to the right of the figure below. Note that your entries need to add up to 100 and that no decimals are allowed. From our experience, this question takes a bit of time to be answered carefully.”(Source: Alesina et al. (2018))

Figure B.1: Question to elicit belief of intergenerational income mobility

Parents' income group		Children's income group, once they grow up	
The richest 100 families		The richest 100 families	0
The 2nd richest 100 families		The 2nd richest 100 families	0
The middle 100 families		The middle 100 families	0
The 2nd poorest 100 families		The 2nd poorest 100 families	0
The poorest 100 families		The poorest 100 families	0
		TOTAL	0

Belief about degree of poverty in Switzerland

“According to the Swiss Federal Office for Statistics, the poverty line in Switzerland is equal to 2'293 francs per month for a single-person household, and 3'968 francs per month for a household with two adults and two children. This means that any single-person household living with less than 2'293 francs per month is considered as “living in poverty”. Similarly, a person living in a household consisting of 2 children and 2 adults with an income of less than 3'968 francs per month is considered as “living in poverty”. Currently, Switzerland has a population of 8.6 million people. In your opinion, how many people in Switzerland currently

live with an income below the poverty line?" [1. Less than 100'000 people, 2. Between 100'001 and 200'000 people, 3. Between 200'001 and 300'000 people, 4. Between 300'001 and 400'000 people, 5. Between 400'001 and 500'000 people, 6. Between 500'001 and 600'000 people, 7. Between 600'001 and 700'000 people, 8. Between 700'001 and 800'000 people, 9. Between 800'001 and 900'000 people, 10. Between 900'001 and 1 million people, 11. Above 1 million people]

Belief about income distribution

"The next question refers to your perception of the income received by different groups of people in Switzerland. By "income" we mean all the revenue people receive for their work, but also the revenue they get from their investments (e.g., returns on bonds, stocks or bank account) or what they receive from the state (e.g., pensions or other welfare benefits). For this question, we focus on 100 individuals that represent the Swiss population. We divide these 100 people into 7 different groups, ranging from the 1% of the people with the highest income in Switzerland (the top 1%), to the 20% of the people with the lowest income in Switzerland (the bottom 20%). All these groups are depicted in the figure below, ranked from the 1% with the highest income to the 20% with the lowest incomes. Think about the total income that is received by all the people in Switzerland. In your opinion, what percent of the total income in Switzerland does each of the groups shown in the figure below receive? Please fill out the entries to the right of the figure below. Note that your entries need to add up to 100 and that no decimals are allowed. From our experience, this question takes a bit of time to be answered carefully."

Figure B.2: Question to elicit belief of income distribution

The diagram shows 100 people represented by human icons, divided into 7 groups. Each group is associated with a text label, a set of icons, and a text box for the percentage of total income they receive.

- The 1% highest-earning people (1 icon) receive the following share (%) of the total income:
- The following 9% (top 2-10%) of income earners (9 icons) receive the following share (%) of the total income:
- The following 10% (top 11-20%) of income earners (10 icons) receive the following share (%) of the total income:
- The following 20% (top 21-40%) of income earners (20 icons) receive the following share (%) of the total income:
- The middle 20% of income earners (20 icons) receive the following share (%) of the total income:
- The second lowest 20% of income earners (20 icons) receive the following share (%) of the total income:
- The 20% lowest-earning people (20 icons) receive the following share (%) of the total income:
- TOTAL**

Belief about wealth distribution

“The next question refers to your perception of how much wealth is possessed by different groups of people in Switzerland. By “wealth”, also known as net worth, we mean the total value of everything someone owns minus any debt that he or she owes. A person’s net worth includes the sum of all their savings and all their other assets such as real estate property, stocks, bonds, art collections, etc., minus the sum of all their liabilities such as loans and mortgages. For this question, we focus on 100 people that represent the Swiss population. We divide these 100 people into 7 different groups, ranging from the 1% of the people with the highest wealth in Switzerland (the richest 1%) to the 20% of the people with the lowest wealth in Switzerland (the poorest 20%). All these groups are depicted in the figure below, ranked from the 1% with the highest wealth to the 20% with the lowest wealth. Think about all the wealth that is possessed by all the people in Switzerland. In your opinion, what percent of total wealth in Switzerland is possessed by each of the groups shown in the figure below? Please fill out the entries to the right of the figure below. Note that your entries need to add up to 100 and that no decimals are allowed. From our experience, this question takes a bit of time to be answered carefully.”

Figure B.3: Question to elicit belief of wealth distribution

the richest 1% } possess the following share (%) of the total wealth:

the richest 2 to 10% } possess the following share (%) of the total wealth:

the richest 11 to 20% } possess the following share (%) of the total wealth:

the second richest 20% } possess the following share (%) of the total wealth:

the middle 20% } possess the following share (%) of the total wealth:

the second poorest 20% } possess the following share (%) of the total wealth:

the poorest 20% } possess the following share (%) of the total wealth:

TOTAL

Distrust in politicians

"What do you think about the following statement? Swiss politicians work to enrich themselves and the lobbies that they support instead of working for the benefit of the majority of the citizens." [1. Completely disagree, 2. Disagree, 3. Rather disagree, 4. Neither agree nor disagree, 5. Rather Agree, 6. Agree, 7. Absolutely agree]

Preference measures and trust

We measured risk preferences, patience, negative reciprocity and positive reciprocity, as well as subjects' general trust in people with the experimentally validated survey questions of Falk et al. (2022).

Financial situation

Own income. *"We now turn to a few questions that relate to your income and your current financial situation. By "income" we mean all the revenue you receive for your work, but also the revenue you get from your investments (e.g., returns on bonds, stocks or bank account) or what you receive from the state (e.g., pensions or other welfare benefits). How much was your income last month (before taxes)? [Less than 3'000 francs, between 3,001 and 4,000 francs,*

between 4,001 and 5,000 francs, . . . , between 13'001 and 14'000 francs, between 14'001 and 15'000 francs, more than 15'000 francs, No answer]

Income mobility Two mobility measures are constructed from the following three questions (based on Fong (2001) and Gallup):

1. *Think of the picture of a ladder. Suppose we say that step 10, which is at the top of the ladder, represents the group with the highest income in Switzerland, and that step 0, at the bottom of the ladder, represents the group with the lowest income in Switzerland. On which step of the ladder do you feel you personally stand at the present time? [0, . . . , 10] [current step]*
2. *On which step would you say you stood five years ago? [0, . . . , 10] [past step]*
3. *Just your best guess, on which step do you think you will stand in five years? [0, . . . , 10] [future step]*

Based on these questions, we create the following two measures:

- Beliefs about future mobility = future step - current step.
- Perceived past mobility = current step – past step.

Own wealth *"We now turn to a few questions that relate to your wealth and the wealth you might have inherited from your parents. By "wealth", also known as net worth, we mean the total value of everything you own minus any debt that you owe. Your net worth includes the sum of all your savings and all your other assets such as real estate property, stocks, bonds, art collections, etc., minus the sum of all your liabilities such as loans and mortgages. Think about the sum of everything you own, minus the debt you owe. How much do you estimate is your current net worth? [My debt exceeds what I own, Between 0 and 25'000 francs, Between 25'001 and 50'000 francs, Between 50'001 and 75'000 francs, Between 75'001 and 100'000 francs, Between 100'001 and 200'000 francs, Between 200'001 and 500'000 francs, Between 500'001 and 1'000'000 francs, Between 1'000'001 and 2'000'000 francs, more than 2'000'000 francs, No answer]*

Capital investments *Is part of your wealth invested in funds, shares, bonds, and similar financial assets? (For this question, please ignore retirement provisions that relate to your 2. pillar.) [Yes,No]*

B.2 Details on the measurement of covariates from wave 2

Beliefs about income inequality (Priors) We elicit these beliefs using a two-step approach. First, we ask

Think about the total income that is received by all the people in Switzerland. In your opinion, what is the share (in %) of the total income that is received by the top 1% of people with the highest incomes in Switzerland? [0-10%, 11-20%....., 91-100%]

Next, we refine participants answers by asking them to provide a point estimate within the range they chose

You just indicated that you believe that the share of the total income that is received by the top 1% of people with the highest incomes in Switzerland lies between X and Y%. Please give your precise estimate within this interval now. In my opinion, the share of the total income that is received by the top 1% of people with the highest incomes in Switzerland is [...] %.

Beliefs about income inequality (Posterior) We elicit posterior beliefs about income inequality using the following question:


We now would like to ask you again about your knowledge about the income distribution in Switzerland. Think about the total income that is received by all the people in Switzerland. According to your knowledge, what is the share (in %) of the total income that is received by the top 1% of people with the highest incomes in Switzerland? [...] %

B.3 Information intervention

The information intervention consists of two separate screens. On the first screen, treated subjects receive the following introductory message: *“In recent years, questions related to the distribution of income have been frequently discussed in the society. When discussing such issues, it is important to have accurate information. The Federal Department of Finance collects data that provide an objective measure of the extent of income inequality in Switzerland. As you might not be aware of these numbers, we will reveal them to you in the next screen.”* The information is provided on the second screen (see the screenshot below). It contains four elements: 1. We tell subjects whether they are [overestimating, underestimating, correctly estimating] the income share of the top 1%; 2. We remind them of their prior belief; 3. We inform them about the true share of total income that is received by the top 1% of people with the highest incomes in Switzerland using the latest objective data collected by the Federal Department of Finance; 4. We also provide a graphical representation of how their prior belief compares with the truth.

Figure B.4: Presentation format of the information intervention (example of a participant who overestimates inequality)

You are overestimating the income share that the top 1% of people with the highest incomes in Switzerland receive. You told us that you believe that they receive **58%** of the total annual income (**red bar** in graph below). According to the objective data collected by the Federal Department of Finance, the top 1% actually receive **12%** of the total annual income (**green bar** in graph below).



B.4 Demographic characteristics of sample population

We depict the main descriptive statistics in Table B.1, separately for the treatment and the control group. The last column indicates that our treatment is well balanced across the main observable characteristics, as well as across preference types. The table also indicates that our sample is broadly representative of the Swiss population with respect to age, gender, geographical area, and income.

Table B.1: Descriptive statistics and balance checks

	Population	Treatment	Control	<i>p</i> -value (<i>t</i> -test)
Age (mean)	51.1	46.8	48.3	.101
Male	0.48	0.53	0.52	.702
French-speaking	0.25	0.27	0.23	.143
Income bracket : $\leq$ CHF 4000	0.28	0.32	0.32	.852
Income bracket : CHF 4001-6000	0.26	0.22	0.22	.841
Income bracket : CHF 6001-8000	0.22	0.21	0.19	.490
Income bracket : CHF 8001-10000	0.12	0.11	0.11	.978
Income bracket : CHF 10001-15000	0.09	0.06	0.08	.173
Income bracket : $\geq$ CHF 15000	0.03	0.02	0.03	.628
Income bracket : NA	-	0.05	0.05	.541
Above-median belief about own control over success	-	0.46	0.46	.957
Prior belief about income share of top 1%	-	52.9	55.6	.091
Above-median prior belief about income share of top 1%	-	0.47	0.52	.113
Inequality Averse type	-	0.46	0.47	.902
Altruistic type	-	0.39	0.37	.641
Selfish type	-	0.15	0.16	.647

Note: The table displays descriptive statistics of the Swiss population and of our sample, separately for the treatment and the control group. The descriptive statistics include age (mean), the share of male people, the share of French-speaking people, as well as the shares of people falling into each monthly income bracket. The population data were obtained from the Swiss Federal Bureau of Statistics (2018) and are restricted to the adult Swiss population (i.e., individuals holding a Swiss passport who are at least 18 years old). In addition, the descriptive statistics include the share of subjects with above-median beliefs about own control over success in life, the prior belief about the income share of the top 1% (percentage), as well as the share of subjects with above-median prior beliefs about the income share of the top 1%. Finally, the descriptive statistics include the shares of inequality averse, altruistic, and selfish subjects.

B.5 Attrition

In the Table B.2, we show that participation in the second wave is orthogonal to the treatment, to the preference type, and to the bulk of the observable characteristics. Note that older respondents are slightly more likely *not* to drop out between waves.

Table B.2: Participation in 2021 wave

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment	0.016 (0.023)					0.020 (0.023)
IA		0.022 (0.034)				0.024 (0.035)
Altruistic		-0.030 (0.036)				0.015 (0.036)
Income bracket: ≤ CHF 4000			-0.014 (0.057)			0.001 (0.057)
Income bracket: CHF 4001-6000			0.026 (0.059)			0.017 (0.058)
Income bracket: CHF 6001-8000			0.070 (0.059)			0.039 (0.059)
Income bracket: CHF 8001-10000			0.009 (0.064)			-0.037 (0.064)
Income bracket: CHF 10001-15000			0.041 (0.069)			-0.008 (0.070)
Income bracket: > CHF 15000			-0.043 (0.095)			-0.090 (0.094)
Above-median belief of own control over success				0.009 (0.024)		0.007 (0.023)
Male					0.029 (0.023)	0.035 (0.025)
Age					0.005*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)
French-speaking					-0.020 (0.027)	-0.020 (0.027)
Constant	0.737*** (0.017)	0.748*** (0.030)	0.729*** (0.053)	0.741*** (0.016)	0.509*** (0.041)	0.468*** (0.075)
R^2	0.000	0.003	0.005	0.000	0.033	0.038
Observations	1383	1383	1383	1383	1383	1383

Note: OLS regression. The dependent variable equals 1 if the individual from the first wave participated in the second wave and equals 0 if the individual did not participate. Treatment is a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent is randomized into the information treatment. IA is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the respondent is inequality averse, and Altruistic is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the respondent is altruistic. Income brackets are dummy variables that equal 1 if the respondent falls into the respective monthly income category. Above-median beliefs about own control over success is a dummy variable indicating whether a subject has high beliefs of own control over success in life. Further socio-demographic variables include a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent is male, age, and a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent's native language is French. Levels of significance: * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

C Identifying preference types using DP-Means

C.1 The method

We identify heterogeneity in preferences by applying a nonparametric Bayesian approach—the Dirichlet Process (DP) means clustering algorithm (Kulis and Jordan, 2012). This appendix only provides a brief overview of this method. For a detailed description of the DPM algorithm and for a discussion of its key differences with other clustering methods, see Fehr ^(r) al. (forthcoming, 2023).

This DP-means algorithm groups individuals into clusters according to their *behavioral similarities*. In our context, clusters are based on subjects’ 12 distributional choices in the money allocation task (Figure 2a), and similarity is measured by “how close” an individual’s allocation profile is to the average allocation of a cluster. Our implementation of the algorithm is based on an iterative refinement. We first span an m -dimensional space, with m denoting the number of budget lines used for the clustering algorithm (in our case, $m = 12$, the twelve budget lines presented in Figure 2a). Each individual’s choices are represented by a single point in the 12-dimensional space. We then ask how subjects populate this space. Specifically, we are interested in the number of clusters (i.e. types) that emerge and individuals’ assignment to clusters. A cluster is characterized by the set of the individuals assigned to the cluster and the associated mean vector of observations (the “centroid”), which – in our case – represents the mean (cluster- representative) behavior of all individuals in m -dimensional space that belong to the cluster.

We initialize the algorithm with a single centroid specified as the global mean vector. At this stage, all data points are assigned to this single centroid. We then refine by iterating over the following two steps: First, we sequentially go through the list of data points in m -dimensional space (i.e. subjects), and check for each subject whether any of the squared Euclidean distances to the centroid exceeds a cluster penalty parameter. If this is the case, we open up a new cluster with the actual data point’s location vector as the centroid. Otherwise, we assign the data point to its nearest cluster. Second, we collect the subjects assigned to the same clusters and update the centroids by computing the mean vector for each cluster. These two steps

are repeated until convergence is reached, i.e. until there is no change in subjects' assignments.

An important aspect of the DP-means approach is that it enables the identification of preference types without committing to a prespecified number of different preference types. Moreover, this approach does neither require an ex-ante specification or parameterization of types, nor does it presume a specific error structure. This means that it remains ex-ante agnostic about key distributional assumptions, and it does not constrain heterogeneity to lie within a predetermined set of models or parameter space.¹ The DP-means algorithm allows for all possible type partitions of the data spanning from a representative agent up to as many types as there are individuals in the population, i.e., it determines the number of preferences types endogenously. Thus, (i) the actual number of types, (ii) the assignment of each individual to one of the types and (iii) the behavioral (preference) properties of the types emerge endogenously.²

¹In this regard, our approach differs from previous work (e.g. Bellemare et al., 2008; Fisman et al., 2015, 2017; Bruhin et al., 2018) that characterized preference heterogeneity on the basis of structural assumptions on preferences and error terms.

²The fact that the number of types adapts to the data has important benefits (see Kulis and Jordan, 2012). Most notably, as previous work has shown (see Comiter et al., 2016), this feature of the algorithm yields higher quality type-separation than methods that specify the number of types prior to clustering (such as k -means).

C.2 Distribution of choices for each preference type

The application of the DP-means algorithm to the money allocation task in our general population sample suggests the existence of *three* behavioral types. Roughly half of the subjects (46.5%) are assigned to Type 1, around one-third (38.1%) to Type 2, and the remainder (15.4%) to Type 3. The three types differ substantially in terms of their behavior. A careful examination of the decisions of these types permits us to assign them a label with a clear behavioral interpretation.

Figure C.1 depicts the relative share of own-payoff minimizing, payoff-equalizing, and own-payoff-maximizing choices, for each identified cluster.³ Positively sloped budget lines inform us on subjects' willingness to pay to decrease the payoff of those better off, while negatively sloped budget lines inform us on their willingness to pay to increase the payoff of those worse off.

The figure shows that individuals in type 1 predominantly make payoff-equalizing choices, both for negatively sloped budget lines and for positively sloped budget lines. They thus exhibit a willingness to pay (i) for reducing inequality when this involves increasing the other individual's payoff (i.e., for negative slopes) and (ii) when it involves decreasing the other individual's payoff (i.e., for positive slopes). For this reason, we assign them the label *inequality averse*.

This pattern contrasts sharply with individuals assigned to type 2, who display a substantial willingness to pay to increase the other individual's payoff (negatively sloped budget lines), but are generally unwilling to pay to decrease the other's payoff (budget lines with positive slope). We therefore label individuals in this cluster as "altruists."


Last, individuals in the third cluster make predominantly own-payoff maximizing choices. We therefore label them as "predominantly selfish".

If our preference interpretation of the behavioral types is correct and stable across budget bundles, the different types should display characteristic behavioral patterns

³Recall that subjects had to make a choice on twelve different budget lines. For each budget line, subjects could choose among seven different allocations. A choice is classified as own-payoff minimizing (own-payoff maximizing) if it belongs to the two choices that give the subject the lowest (highest) payoff. It is classified as payoff-equalizing if it implements perfect equality or one of its nearest neighbouring allocations.

in other situations (out of sample). For example, the inequality averse type should also display a preference for equality in new decision situations. Likewise, the selfish type should also predominantly maximize its own payoff in these alternative budget lines. In Fehr $\text{\textcircled{r}}$ al. (forthcoming, 2023), we show that this is indeed the case.

Figure C.1: Distribution of choices for positively and negatively sloped budget lines in each cluster



C.3 The Correlates of Social Preferences

In this Appendix, we explore whether and how the distribution of social preference types varies across different categories of individuals. Table C.1 shows the distribution of preferences between individuals with different sociodemographic characteristics. Recall that, over the whole sample, 46.5 percent of the individuals are inequality averse, 38.12 percent are altruistic, and 15.42 are predominantly selfish (for convenience, we display these proportions on the top row in bold). The subsequent rows show whether and how these proportion vary with individual characteristics. For example, the second and third rows show how this distribution changes for male and female respondents. Among male respondents, 36.67 percent belong to the inequality averse type, 44.07 percent to the altruistic type, and 19.26 percent to the predominantly selfish type. Turning to women, 57.23 percent are assigned to the inequality averse, 31.57 to the altruistic type and 11.2 percent to the predominantly selfish type. Overall, this table shows that—with some exceptions—the distribution of types is fairly consistent across individuals with different characteristics: The inequality averse type tends to be the most prevalent, while the predominantly selfish type tends to be the least prevalent. In Table C.2, we repeat the exercise but we now explore whether and how the distribution of preference types varies across categories of individuals with different economic preferences (e.g., risk aversion) or with different beliefs (e.g., beliefs about upwards mobility).

C.3.1 Socio-demographics

Table C.1: Distribution of preference types (in %) by socio-demographic characteristics

	Inequality Averse	Altruistic	Selfish
Average type prevalence	46.46	38.12	15.42
Male	36.67	44.07	19.26
Female	57.23	31.57	11.20
Age bracket : 18-25 y.o.	30.77	59.34	9.89
Age bracket : 26-35 y.o.	32.48	55.41	12.10
Age bracket : 36-45 y.o.	41.38	43.97	14.66
Age bracket : 46-55 y.o.	50.00	33.51	16.49
Age bracket : 56-65 y.o.	57.89	27.19	14.91
Age bracket : > 65 y.o.	58.14	17.83	24.03
French-Speaking	43.70	37.01	19.29
Married	51.26	31.91	16.83
Education: Obligatory school	45.83	25.00	29.17
Education: Vocational training	58.58	22.69	18.73
Education: High school	39.29	50.00	10.71
Education: University	34.18	53.57	12.24
Education: Other	54.84	28.23	16.94
Occupation: Full-time worker	43.12	41.06	15.83
Occupation: Part-time worker	51.99	35.02	13.00
Occupation: Student	25.00	69.44	5.56
Occupation: Pensioner	52.60	23.12	24.28
Occupation: Unemployed	46.88	53.12	0.00
Occupation: Other	56.10	24.39	19.51
History of being unemployed in the past	45.53	39.84	14.63

C.3.2 Preference Survey Module and other covariates

Table C.2: Distribution of preference types (in %) by other preference measures and beliefs

	Inequality Averse	Altruistic	Selfish
Average type prevalence	46.46	38.12	15.42
Risk aversion – Low	54.02	34.02	11.97
Risk aversion – High	36.55	43.50	19.96
Positive reciprocity (return favor) – Low	46.66	36.96	16.39
Positive reciprocity (return favor) – High	46.19	39.72	14.09
Positive reciprocity (reciprocate help) – Low	44.71	41.19	14.10
Positive reciprocity (reciprocate help) – High	48.37	34.76	16.87
Negative reciprocity (revenge unfair treatment) – Low	50.69	36.83	12.48
Negative reciprocity (revenge unfair treatment) – High	42.40	39.35	18.25
Negative reciprocity (retaliate intentional malice) – Low	52.01	35.58	12.41
Negative reciprocity (retaliate intentional malice) – High	40.17	40.99	18.84
Impatience – Low	40.52	43.12	16.36
Impatience – High	52.94	32.66	14.40
Trust in people – Low	47.26	34.49	18.25
Trust in people – High	45.55	42.24	12.22
Belief of income share of top 1% – Low	42.75	40.62	16.63
Belief of income share of top 1% – High	50.19	35.60	14.20
Belief of own control over success – Low	46.15	40.43	13.42
Belief of own control over success – High	46.82	35.38	17.80
Belief of intergenerational income mobility – Low	41.78	46.81	11.41
Belief of intergenerational income mobility – High	51.17	29.38	19.46
Perceived degree of poverty in CH – Low	40.79	44.40	14.80
Perceived degree of poverty in CH – High	53.04	30.82	16.14
Believed gini of income distribution – Low	47.67	36.05	16.28
Believed gini of income distribution – High	45.24	40.19	14.56
Believed gini of wealth distribution – Low	47.77	33.79	18.45
Believed gini of wealth distribution – High	45.16	42.44	12.40
Beliefs about future upwards mobility – Low	49.92	32.98	17.10
Beliefs about future upwards mobility – High	40.27	47.30	12.43
Perceived past upwards mobility – Low	48.23	34.75	17.02
Perceived past upwards mobility – High	44.33	42.18	13.49
Distrust in politicians – Low	44.16	40.55	15.29
Distrust in politicians – High	49.44	34.97	15.59


Note: For each preference and beliefs measure, we split respondents into individuals with low responses and those with high responses. For example, "Risk aversion – Low" comprises individuals with a level of risk aversion below the median, and "Risk aversion – High" comprises individuals with a level of risk aversion above the median.

D Additional Tables and Figures

D.1 Subjects' income and (mis)perceptions of income inequality

Several results hinge on conditioning on whether the respondent's income is below or above the median. It is therefore important to assess whether income predicts misperceptions about the income share of the top 1%. Importantly, it does not. On average, respondents with an income below the median overestimate the share of total income received by the top 1% by 42.4 pp (SD: 25.2 pp), while those with an income above the median overestimate it by 41.6 pp (SD: 26.0 pp), respectively. A Kruskal–Wallis equality-of-populations test cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal populations ($p = 0.665$). Misperceptions about the income share of the top 1% do also *not* substantially differ when we further disaggregate the data by preference type and income category, as documented in Figure D.1. While some small differences exist, a Kruskal–Wallis equality-of-populations test cannot reject the null hypothesis of equality of populations ($p = 0.379$).

Figure D.1: Misperceptions about the income share of the top 1% by preference type and income




Note: The figure shows the average misperceptions about the income share of the top 1% of income earners in Switzerland by income category and preference type (with standard errors). The y-axis reports average misperceptions, i.e., the difference between respondents' average prior belief and the actual income share received by the top 1%.

D.2 Beliefs about the income of top 1% by wave


Despite two very different elicitation techniques (see details in Appendix B.1 and B.2), and a gap of several months between the two waves, we find that prior beliefs about the income of the top 1% elicited in wave 2 and the beliefs about the income of the top 1% elicited in wave 1 are strongly and significantly correlated ($\rho = 0.34$, $p < 0.001$). This result is also clearly visible in the binned scatterplot below, which depicts wave 2 beliefs on the x-axis and wave 1 beliefs on the y-axis.

Figure D.2: Beliefs about the income of top 1% by wave



D.3 Prior beliefs about income inequality

Figure D.3: Distribution of prior beliefs about the income share of the top 1%




Note: The figure depicts the distribution of prior beliefs about the income share of the top 1% of income-earners in Switzerland. The vertical red line indicating the actual share.

D.4 Posterior beliefs about income inequality

Figure D.4 shows that the vast majority of the treated subjects (77.3%) correctly updated their beliefs, i.e., that they hold correct posterior beliefs.

Figure D.4: Posterior beliefs about the income share of the top 1% among subjects in the treatment group



Note: Distribution of posterior beliefs about the income share of the top 1% of income-earners in Switzerland among subjects in the treatment group. The vertical red line indicates the actual share of 12%.

Importantly, individuals from all three preference types correctly update their beliefs, as shown in Section 5.3 of the main paper. Moreover, a Kruskal–Wallis test cannot reject the null hypothesis that individuals with different preference types update beliefs to a similar extent ($p = 0.686$). In addition, none of the Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests can reject the null hypothesis of equality of distributions when making pairwise comparisons of distributions in posterior beliefs.⁴


Moreover, we also find conclusive evidence that respondents across preference types hold similar posterior beliefs about the income share of the top 1% (see Figure D.5). A Kruskal–Wallis test fails to reject the null hypothesis that individuals with different preference types hold similar posterior beliefs at conventional significant levels ($p = 0.088$). In addition, none of the Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests performed between preference types can reject the null hypothesis of equality of distributions of

⁴Pairwise comparisons in belief updating (Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests): inequality averse vs. selfish ($p = 0.706$), altruistic vs. selfish ($p = 0.238$), inequality averse vs. altruistic ($p = 0.392$).


posterior beliefs.⁵

Figure D.5: Posterior beliefs about the income share of the top 1%


Type 1 : Inequality averse



Type 2 : Altruistic



Type 3 : Selfish




Note: Distribution of posterior beliefs about the income share of the top 1% of income-earners in Switzerland among subjects in the treatment group by preference type. The vertical red line indicates the actual share of 12%.

⁵Pairwise comparisons of distribution of posterior beliefs (Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests): inequality averse vs. selfish ($p = 1.000$), altruistic vs. selfish ($p = 0.876$), inequality averse vs. altruistic ($p = 0.850$).


D.5 Donations

Figure D.6: Donations in favor of the 99% initiative



Note: Distribution of donation amount towards an organization in favor of the 99% initiative, with donations towards an organization that opposes the 99% initiative coded as negative values, i.e., the values can range from CHF -20 to CHF +20.

Figure D.7: Average donations in favor of the 99% initiative of control group subjects by preference type



Note: This figure depicts the average donation amount towards an organization in favor of the 99% initiative of control group subjects by preference type (with standard errors). Donations towards an organization that opposes the 99% initiative are coded as negative values, i.e., the values can range from CHF -20 to CHF +20.

D.6 Full regression table

Table D.1: Determinants of donations in favor of the 99% initiative - full table

	Full sample				Below median income		Above median income	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment	-1.106 (0.684)	-0.999 (0.668)	1.983 (1.881)	2.042 (1.825)	0.436 (2.694)	1.727 (2.815)	2.643 (2.860)	2.553 (2.718)
IA			6.871*** (1.519)	5.341*** (1.514)	4.721** (2.123)	4.501* (2.454)	8.232*** (2.288)	6.407*** (2.130)
Altruistic			5.001*** (1.554)	4.350*** (1.536)	3.777* (2.156)	3.730 (2.523)	5.133** (2.337)	5.434** (2.194)
Treat x IA			-4.298** (2.145)	-3.909* (2.091)	-1.001 (2.981)	-2.315 (3.077)	-7.252** (3.381)	-6.542** (3.247)
Treat x Altruistic			-2.951 (2.129)	-3.258 (2.066)	-0.716 (2.932)	-2.289 (3.069)	-4.252 (3.356)	-4.195 (3.266)
Belief of income share of top 1%		-0.003 (0.014)		-0.005 (0.014)		-0.019 (0.018)		0.010 (0.023)
Belief of own control over success (z)		-1.280*** (0.332)		-1.271*** (0.330)		-0.770* (0.439)		-1.764*** (0.575)
Belief of intergenerational income mobility (z)		-0.727** (0.353)		-0.622* (0.354)		-0.894* (0.469)		-0.606 (0.597)
Perceived degree of poverty in CH (z)		0.670* (0.349)		0.657* (0.351)		0.628 (0.454)		0.604 (0.645)
Believed gini of income distribution		3.855** (1.676)		4.137** (1.663)		5.382** (2.228)		4.242 (2.631)
Believed gini of wealth distribution		1.592 (1.922)		1.404 (1.916)		2.326 (2.443)		-1.743 (2.961)
Beliefs about future upwards mobility (z)		-0.412 (0.394)		-0.327 (0.399)		0.005 (0.483)		-1.365 (0.854)
Perceived past upwards mobility (z)		0.550 (0.398)		0.534 (0.396)		0.008 (0.468)		2.307*** (0.783)
Distrust in politicians (z)		0.034 (0.372)		-0.030 (0.364)		-0.385 (0.473)		0.613 (0.622)
Male		-0.160 (0.796)		0.057 (0.797)		-0.541 (1.029)		0.592 (1.534)
Age		0.140 (0.184)		0.147 (0.184)		0.025 (0.233)		0.576 (0.374)
Age squared		-0.001 (0.002)		-0.001 (0.002)		0.000 (0.003)		-0.005 (0.004)
French-speaking		0.478 (0.796)		0.492 (0.795)		0.488 (0.988)		1.470 (1.473)
Married		0.288 (0.750)		0.281 (0.746)		0.953 (1.033)		-1.033 (1.230)
Education: Vocational training		-0.949 (1.975)		-1.249 (2.128)		0.519 (2.600)		-4.720 (4.348)
Education: High school		-0.592 (2.114)		-0.970 (2.263)		0.804 (2.717)		-5.077 (4.804)
Education: University		-1.043 (2.018)		-1.359 (2.172)		0.608 (2.688)		-6.830 (4.313)
Education: Other		-1.187 (2.179)		-1.532 (2.321)		1.283 (2.858)		-7.722* (4.552)
Occupation: Part-time worker		1.188 (0.886)		1.327 (0.883)		-0.366 (1.249)		3.453** (1.555)
Occupation: Student		0.559 (1.375)		0.312 (1.392)		-1.883 (1.577)		-8.590** (3.834)
Occupation: Pensioner		2.397 (1.725)		2.678 (1.758)		1.155 (2.309)		4.439 (2.999)
Occupation: Unemployed		2.218 (1.793)		1.933 (1.798)		0.480 (2.029)		-1.363 (7.653)
Occupation: Other		-1.000 (1.593)		-0.738 (1.558)		-3.231* (1.873)		-0.115 (3.379)
History of being unemployed in the past		0.016 (0.730)		-0.058 (0.728)		-1.062 (0.922)		1.253 (1.323)
Risk aversion (z)		-0.364 (0.364)		-0.193 (0.364)		0.158 (0.463)		-0.201 (0.645)
Positive reciprocity (return favor)		1.058*** (0.368)		0.987*** (0.366)		0.831 (0.522)		0.965 (0.597)
Positive reciprocity (reciprocate help)		-0.235 (0.349)		-0.191 (0.348)		0.040 (0.464)		-0.581 (0.565)
Negative reciprocity (revenge unfair treatment)		-0.175 (0.526)		-0.176 (0.530)		0.365 (0.668)		-0.596 (0.876)
Negative reciprocity (retaliate intentional malice)		-0.242 (0.533)		-0.169 (0.539)		-0.089 (0.695)		-0.262 (0.896)
Impatience (z)		-0.223 (0.349)		-0.260 (0.344)		0.300 (0.454)		-0.698 (0.614)
Trust in people (z)		0.922** (0.367)		0.855** (0.359)		0.487 (0.490)		1.493** (0.617)
Wealth invested in financial assets		-1.129 (0.741)		-1.240* (0.734)		-0.432 (0.897)		-1.846 (1.297)
Constant	6.644*** (0.471)	-0.708 (4.592)	1.568 (1.376)	-4.795 (4.875)	3.314* (1.964)	-1.754 (6.243)	0.721 (1.996)	-11.661 (9.310)
Wealth bracket dummies	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
p-value(Ho: Treat x IA ≥ 0)			0.023	0.031	0.369	0.226	0.016	0.022
R ²	0.003	0.132	0.029	0.146	0.020	0.136	0.038	0.232
Observations	1031	1030	1031	1030	558	557	422	422

Notes. OLS regression. The dependent variable is the donation amount towards an organization in favor of the 99% initiative for the full sample (columns 1-4), for subjects with an income below the median (columns 5-6), and for subjects with an income above the median (columns 7-8). Subjects who did not disclose their income are not included in columns 5-8. Wealth bracket dummies include dummy variables for each wealth level. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. p-value(Ho: Treat × IA ≥ 0) indicates the p-value associated with a one-sided test evaluating the null hypothesis that the information intervention has a non-negative effect on the donations of the inequality averse subjects. Levels of significance: * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

D.7 Robustness analysis: attention checks

In this Appendix, we show that our main regression results are robust to excluding participants who did not successfully pass our attention checks. The second wave of the experiment (where the information intervention took place) included two attention checks. Table D.2 shows the regression results for participants who pass at least one attention check, and replicates the main results discussed in the paper. In particular, the interaction between the treatment and the inequality aversion dummy is significant for above-median income earners ($p = 0.014$ for $H_0 : \beta_4 \geq 0$). Table D.3 focuses only on subjects who successfully pass both attention checks and delivers a qualitatively similar message, although we are unfortunately underpowered to detect a significant interaction between the information intervention and the inequality aversion dummy for the respondents with an above-median income ($p = 0.068$ for $H_0 : \beta_4 \geq 0$).

Table D.2: Pass one of the two attention checks

	Full sample				Below median income		Above median income	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment	-1.599** (0.705)	-1.391** (0.691)	1.553 (1.962)	2.039 (1.900)	-0.941 (2.875)	0.859 (3.027)	3.510 (2.898)	3.389 (2.758)
IA			7.280*** (1.602)	6.039*** (1.592)	5.105** (2.235)	5.486** (2.559)	8.647*** (2.435)	7.197*** (2.283)
Altruistic			5.421*** (1.633)	5.275*** (1.604)	4.005* (2.268)	4.372* (2.594)	6.093** (2.452)	6.649*** (2.321)
Treat x IA			-4.366* (2.240)	-4.487** (2.181)	-0.211 (3.165)	-2.023 (3.301)	-7.934** (3.477)	-7.331** (3.325)
Treat x Altruistic			-2.844 (2.205)	-3.460 (2.136)	0.405 (3.101)	-1.097 (3.269)	-5.579 (3.416)	-5.586* (3.305)
Constant	7.210*** (0.478)	-2.366 (4.479)	1.725 (1.465)	-6.832 (4.777)	3.484* (2.090)	-4.386 (6.131)	0.583 (2.117)	-12.865 (9.180)
Beliefs	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Socio-demographics	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Education	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Occupation	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Preference measures	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Wealth bracket dummies & financial assets	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
p-value(Ho: Treat x IA $\geq$ 0)			0.026	0.020	0.473	0.270	0.012	0.014
R ²	0.005	0.132	0.035	0.150	0.030	0.142	0.041	0.254
Observations	931	930	931	930	506	505	379	379

Note: OLS regression. The dependent variable is the donation amount towards an organization in favor of the 99% initiative for the full sample (columns 1-4), for subjects with an income below the median (columns 5-6), and for subjects with an income above the median (columns 7-8). Subjects who did not disclose their income are not included in columns 5-8. Beliefs include subjects' prior beliefs about the income share of the top 1%, their prior beliefs about income and wealth distributions in Switzerland, as well as their beliefs about the determinants of success, financial mobility, poverty in Switzerland, and distrust in politicians. Socio-demographics include age, age squared, a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent is male, a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent's native language is French, and a dummy indicating whether the respondent is married. Education includes dummies indicating a respondent's highest educational achievement (compulsory school, vocational training, high school, university, or other). Occupation includes dummies indicating a respondent's occupation status (currently has a full-time job, a part-time job, is a student, is a pensioner, is unemployed, or other), and a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent has experienced unemployment in the past. Preference measures from the global preference survey (Falk et al., 2022) include measures of risk aversion, (positive and negative) reciprocity, impatience, and general trust in strangers. Wealth bracket dummies and financial assets include dummy variables for each wealth level, and a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent has invested part of her wealth in financial assets. For a detailed explanation of the covariates, see Appendix B.1. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. p-value(Ho: Treat $\times$ IA $\geq$ 0) indicates the p-value associated with a one-sided test evaluating the null hypothesis that the information intervention has a non-negative effect on the donations of the inequality averse subjects. Levels of significance: * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

Table D.3: Pass both attention checks

	Full sample				Below median income		Above median income	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment	-1.781** (0.749)	-1.717** (0.735)	1.435 (2.201)	1.897 (2.116)	-0.731 (3.336)	1.736 (3.485)	2.681 (3.103)	2.326 (2.849)
IA			7.128*** (1.820)	6.040*** (1.779)	4.621* (2.655)	5.289* (2.994)	8.185*** (2.702)	6.377** (2.513)
Altruistic			5.927*** (1.837)	5.627*** (1.774)	3.952 (2.677)	3.981 (2.986)	6.967*** (2.655)	7.264*** (2.576)
Treat x IA			-4.305* (2.485)	-4.645* (2.380)	-1.109 (3.622)	-3.722 (3.731)	-5.900 (3.741)	-5.258 (3.525)
Treat x Altruistic			-3.119 (2.437)	-3.702 (2.356)	-0.401 (3.544)	-2.397 (3.724)	-4.898 (3.644)	-4.212 (3.500)
Constant	7.302*** (0.514)	-5.215 (4.827)	1.667 (1.678)	-10.145* (5.183)	4.160* (2.524)	-7.497 (6.779)	0.033 (2.326)	-14.330 (9.413)
Beliefs	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Socio-demographics	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Education	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Occupation	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Preference measures	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Wealth bracket dummies & financial assets	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
p-value(Ho: Treat x IA $\geq$ 0)			0.042	0.026	0.380	0.159	0.058	0.068
R ²	0.007	0.137	0.035	0.155	0.024	0.147	0.038	0.262
Observations	817	816	817	816	449	448	329	329

Note: OLS regression. The dependent variable is the donation amount towards an organization in favor of the 99% initiative for the full sample (columns 1-4), for subjects with an income below the median (columns 5-6), and for subjects with an income above the median (columns 7-8). Subjects who did not disclose their income are not included in columns 5-8. Beliefs include subjects' prior beliefs about the income share of the top 1%, their prior beliefs about income and wealth distributions in Switzerland, as well as their beliefs about the determinants of success, financial mobility, poverty in Switzerland, and distrust in politicians. Socio-demographics include age, age squared, a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent is male, a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent's native language is French, and a dummy indicating whether the respondent is married. Education includes dummies indicating a respondent's highest educational achievement (compulsory school, vocational training, high school, university, or other). Occupation includes dummies indicating a respondent's occupation status (currently has a full-time job, a part-time job, is a student, is a pensioner, is unemployed, or other), and a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent has experienced unemployment in the past. Preference measures from the global preference survey (Falk et al., 2022) include measures of risk aversion, (positive and negative) reciprocity, impatience, and general trust in strangers. Wealth bracket dummies and financial assets include dummy variables for each wealth level, and a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent has invested part of her wealth in financial assets. For a detailed explanation of the covariates, see Appendix B.1. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. p-value(Ho: Treat $\times$ IA $\geq$ 0) indicates the p-value associated with a one-sided test evaluating the null hypothesis that the information intervention has a non-negative effect on the donations of the inequality averse subjects. Levels of significance: * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

D.8 Robustness analysis: Focusing on overestimators or subjects with large misperceptions.

In this Appendix, we show that our main results are broadly robust to excluding subjects who did *not* overestimate the income share of the top 1% (Table D.4). In addition, we conduct an additional robustness check following the approach applied by Cruces et al. (2013) and Karadja et al. (2017) which focuses on subjects with “large” misperceptions, i.e., misperceptions of more than 10 percentage points. Focusing on this subsample yields, again, qualitatively similar results (see Table D.5).

Table D.4: Determinants of donations in favor of the 99% initiative for overestimators (subjects with prior beliefs about the income share of the top 1% greater than 12%)

	Full sample				Below median income		Above median income	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment	-1.028 (0.709)	-0.877 (0.692)	2.047 (1.997)	1.992 (1.929)	0.685 (2.834)	1.983 (2.932)	2.445 (3.031)	2.425 (2.904)
IA			6.810*** (1.633)	5.270*** (1.616)	4.720** (2.243)	4.373* (2.566)	8.118*** (2.502)	6.742*** (2.307)
Altruistic			4.657*** (1.665)	4.021** (1.646)	3.482 (2.265)	3.468 (2.620)	4.703* (2.575)	5.077** (2.461)
Treat x IA			-4.117* (2.273)	-3.621 (2.202)	-1.323 (3.135)	-2.594 (3.203)	-6.433* (3.583)	-5.843* (3.421)
Treat x Altruistic			-2.964 (2.238)	-3.072 (2.161)	-0.689 (3.064)	-2.238 (3.184)	-4.301 (3.534)	-4.013 (3.465)
Constant	6.681*** (0.488)	1.026 (4.686)	1.726 (1.491)	-2.998 (5.016)	3.394 (2.081)	1.260 (6.354)	0.919 (2.233)	-14.050 (9.698)
Beliefs	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Socio-demographics	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Education	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Occupation	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Preference measures	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Wealth bracket dummies & financial assets	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
p-value(Ho: Treat x IA $\geq$ 0)			0.035	0.050	0.337	0.209	0.037	0.044
R ²	0.002	0.132	0.028	0.145	0.018	0.138	0.038	0.230
Observations	968	967	968	967	532	531	389	389

Note: OLS regression. The dependent variable is the donation amount towards an organization in favor of the 99% initiative for the full sample (columns 1-4), for subjects with an income below the median (columns 5-6), and for subjects with an income above the median (columns 7-8). Subjects who did not disclose their income are not included in columns 5-8. Beliefs include subjects' prior beliefs about the income share of the top 1%, their prior beliefs about income and wealth distributions in Switzerland, as well as their beliefs about the determinants of success, financial mobility, poverty in Switzerland, and distrust in politicians. Socio-demographics include age, age squared, a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent is male, a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent's native language is French, and a dummy indicating whether the respondent is married. Education includes dummies indicating a respondent's highest educational achievement (compulsory school, vocational training, high school, university, or other). Occupation includes dummies indicating a respondent's occupation status (currently has a full-time job, a part-time job, is a student, is a pensioner, is unemployed, or other), and a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent has experienced unemployment in the past. Preference measures from the global preference survey (Falk et al., 2022) include measures of risk aversion, (positive and negative) reciprocity, impatience, and general trust in strangers. Wealth bracket dummies and financial assets include dummy variables for each wealth level, and a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent has invested part of her wealth in financial assets. For a detailed explanation of the covariates, see Appendix B.1. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. p-value(Ho: Treat $\times$ IA $\geq$ 0) indicates the p-value associated with a one-sided test evaluating the null hypothesis that the information intervention has a non-negative effect on the donations of the inequality averse subjects. Levels of significance: * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

Table D.5: Determinants of donations in favor of the 99% initiative for substantial overestimators (subjects with prior beliefs about the income share of the top 1% greater than 21% who overestimated by at least 10 percentage points)

	Full sample				Below median income		Above median income	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment	-1.356* (0.746)	-1.184 (0.722)	2.231 (2.125)	2.046 (2.033)	0.487 (3.037)	2.309 (3.161)	2.688 (3.184)	1.999 (2.998)
IA			7.073*** (1.721)	5.454*** (1.681)	4.302* (2.408)	4.483 (2.730)	8.968*** (2.590)	6.661*** (2.387)
Altruistic			5.042*** (1.757)	4.509*** (1.726)	3.187 (2.433)	3.618 (2.816)	5.559** (2.675)	5.531** (2.552)
Treat x IA			-4.669* (2.414)	-3.929* (2.319)	-1.195 (3.351)	-2.900 (3.460)	-7.554** (3.750)	-6.182* (3.516)
Treat x Altruistic			-3.553 (2.373)	-3.550 (2.287)	-0.457 (3.279)	-2.363 (3.447)	-5.348 (3.684)	-4.904 (3.594)
Constant	6.793*** (0.508)	3.752 (4.888)	1.530 (1.577)	-0.768 (5.194)	3.690 (2.242)	2.459 (6.656)	0.412 (2.325)	-8.015 (9.815)
Beliefs	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Socio-demographics	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Education	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Occupation	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Preference measures	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Wealth bracket dummies & financial assets	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
p-value(Ho: Treat x IA $\geq$ 0)			0.027	0.045	0.361	0.201	0.022	0.040
R ²	0.004	0.143	0.030	0.157	0.014	0.139	0.050	0.257
Observations	886	885	886	885	484	483	360	360

Note: OLS regression. The dependent variable is the donation amount towards an organization in favor of the 99% initiative for the full sample (columns 1-4), for subjects with an income below the median (columns 5-6), and for subjects with an income above the median (columns 7-8). Subjects who did not disclose their income are not included in columns 5-8. Beliefs include subjects' prior beliefs about the income share of the top 1%, their prior beliefs about income and wealth distributions in Switzerland, as well as their beliefs about the determinants of success, financial mobility, poverty in Switzerland, and distrust in politicians. Socio-demographics include age, age squared, a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent is male, a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent's native language is French, and a dummy indicating whether the respondent is married. Education includes dummies indicating a respondent's highest educational achievement (compulsory school, vocational training, high school, university, or other). Occupation includes dummies indicating a respondent's occupation status (currently has a full-time job, a part-time job, is a student, is a pensioner, is unemployed, or other), and a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent has experienced unemployment in the past. Preference measures from the global preference survey (Falk et al., 2022) include measures of risk aversion, (positive and negative) reciprocity, impatience, and general trust in strangers. Wealth bracket dummies and financial assets include dummy variables for each wealth level, and a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent has invested part of her wealth in financial assets. For a detailed explanation of the covariates, see Appendix B.1. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. p-value(Ho: Treat $\times$ IA $\geq$ 0) indicates the p-value associated with a one-sided test evaluating the null hypothesis that the information intervention has a non-negative effect on the donations of the inequality averse subjects. Levels of significance: * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

D.9 Robustness analysis: survey measures for support for redistribution

In this Appendix, we show that our main results are broadly robust to using the following survey measures as dependent variables:

- An index measure of support for redistribution (based on the following two questions)
- A survey question aimed at measuring support for increasing taxes for the rich (*"The government should reduce income inequality by increasing the taxes for the rich."*)
- A survey question aimed at measuring support for improving the situation of the less well off (*"The government should reduce income inequality by improving the situation of the less well off (e.g. lower their taxes or increasing financial support for them)."*)

The survey items were both measured using 7-point Likert scale where 1 means "strongly disagree" and 7 means "strongly agree".

Table D.6: Determinants of average preferences for stronger redistribution

	Full sample				Below median income		Above median income	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment	-0.188** (0.085)	-0.166** (0.081)	0.298 (0.264)	0.285 (0.246)	0.313 (0.339)	0.465 (0.347)	-0.061 (0.401)	-0.125 (0.369)
IA			0.806*** (0.198)	0.586*** (0.190)	0.433 (0.278)	0.340 (0.297)	1.106*** (0.278)	0.838*** (0.287)
Altruistic			0.529** (0.210)	0.544*** (0.200)	0.312 (0.292)	0.333 (0.317)	0.683** (0.297)	0.676** (0.291)
Treat x IA			-0.672** (0.286)	-0.575** (0.267)	-0.597 (0.366)	-0.728* (0.372)	-0.427 (0.443)	-0.266 (0.409)
Treat x Altruistic			-0.462 (0.300)	-0.485* (0.279)	-0.529 (0.383)	-0.678* (0.376)	-0.122 (0.463)	0.031 (0.436)
Constant	4.987*** (0.060)	4.407*** (0.581)	4.414*** (0.184)	3.929*** (0.597)	4.900*** (0.263)	3.846*** (0.736)	4.000*** (0.246)	3.957*** (1.173)
Beliefs	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Socio-demographics	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Education	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Occupation	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Preference measures	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Wealth bracket dummies & financial assets	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
p-value(Ho: Treat x IA $\geq$ 0)			0.009	0.016	0.052	0.025	0.168	0.257
R ²	0.005	0.186	0.026	0.196	0.013	0.157	0.058	0.287
Observations	1031	1030	1031	1030	558	557	422	422

Note: OLS regression. The dependent variable is the average preference for stronger redistribution (average of the two measures on preferences for increasing the taxes for the rich and preference for improving the situation of the less well) off using a 7-point Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) for the full sample (columns 1-4), for subjects with an income below the median (columns 5-6), and for subjects with an income above the median (columns 7-8). Subjects who did not disclose their income are not included in columns 5-8. Beliefs include subjects' prior beliefs about the income share of the top 1%, their prior beliefs about income and wealth distributions in Switzerland, as well as their beliefs about the determinants of success, financial mobility, poverty in Switzerland, and distrust in politicians. Socio-demographics include age, age squared, a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent is male, a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent's native language is French, and a dummy indicating whether the respondent is married. Education includes dummies indicating a respondent's highest educational achievement (compulsory school, vocational training, high school, university, or other). Occupation includes dummies indicating a respondent's occupation status (currently has a full-time job, a part-time job, is a student, is a pensioner, is unemployed, or other), and a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent has experienced unemployment in the past. Preference measures from the global preference survey (Falk et al., 2022) include measures of risk aversion, (positive and negative) reciprocity, impatience, and general trust in strangers. Wealth bracket dummies and financial assets include dummy variables for each wealth level, and a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent has invested part of her wealth in financial assets. For a detailed explanation of the covariates, see Appendix B.1. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. p-value(Ho: Treat $\times$ IA $\geq$ 0) indicates the p-value associated with a one-sided test evaluating the null hypothesis that the information intervention has a non-negative effect for the inequality averse subjects. Levels of significance:

* $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

Table D.7: Determinants of preferences for increasing taxes for the rich

	Full sample				Below median income		Above median income	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment	-0.188*	-0.150	0.360	0.346	0.282	0.462	0.049	-0.051
	(0.101)	(0.096)	(0.301)	(0.281)	(0.376)	(0.394)	(0.459)	(0.414)
IA			0.815***	0.567**	0.334	0.230	1.234***	0.923***
			(0.236)	(0.229)	(0.316)	(0.341)	(0.343)	(0.343)
Altruistic			0.530**	0.528**	0.239	0.267	0.737**	0.737**
			(0.250)	(0.243)	(0.331)	(0.366)	(0.365)	(0.354)
Treat x IA			-0.682**	-0.581*	-0.498	-0.640	-0.498	-0.292
			(0.328)	(0.306)	(0.411)	(0.425)	(0.510)	(0.466)
Treat x Altruistic			-0.610*	-0.594*	-0.671	-0.794*	-0.146	0.059
			(0.345)	(0.324)	(0.433)	(0.438)	(0.536)	(0.495)
Constant	4.949***	4.771***	4.370***	4.289***	4.943***	4.153***	3.860***	4.078***
	(0.072)	(0.699)	(0.219)	(0.724)	(0.296)	(0.913)	(0.305)	(1.318)
Beliefs	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Socio-demographics	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Education	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Occupation	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Preference measures	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Wealth bracket dummies & financial assets	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
p-value(Ho: Treat x IA $\geq$ 0)			0.019	0.029	0.113	0.066	0.165	0.266
R ²	0.003	0.175	0.020	0.182	0.014	0.129	0.047	0.304
Observations	1031	1030	1031	1030	558	557	422	422

Note: OLS regression. The dependent variable is the preference for increasing taxes for the rich using a 7-point Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) for the full sample (columns 1-4), for subjects with an income below the median (columns 5-6), and for subjects with an income above the median (columns 7-8). Subjects who did not disclose their income are not included in columns 5-8. Beliefs include subjects' prior beliefs about the income share of the top 1%, their prior beliefs about income and wealth distributions in Switzerland, as well as their beliefs about the determinants of success, financial mobility, poverty in Switzerland, and distrust in politicians. Socio-demographics include age, age squared, a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent is male, a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent's native language is French, and a dummy indicating whether the respondent is married. Education includes dummies indicating a respondent's highest educational achievement (compulsory school, vocational training, high school, university, or other). Occupation includes dummies indicating a respondent's occupation status (currently has a full-time job, a part-time job, is a student, is a pensioner, is unemployed, or other), and a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent has experienced unemployment in the past. Preference measures from the global preference survey (Falk et al., 2022) include measures of risk aversion, (positive and negative) reciprocity, impatience, and general trust in strangers. Wealth bracket dummies and financial assets include dummy variables for each wealth level, and a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent has invested part of her wealth in financial assets. For a detailed explanation of the covariates, see Appendix B.1. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. p-value(Ho: Treat x IA $\geq$ 0) indicates the p-value associated with a one-sided test evaluating the null hypothesis that the information intervention has a non-negative effect for the inequality averse subjects. Levels of significance: * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

Table D.8: Determinants of preferences for improving the situation of the less well off

	Full sample				Below median income		Above median income	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment	-0.188** (0.091)	-0.182** (0.089)	0.236 (0.269)	0.224 (0.262)	0.343 (0.355)	0.468 (0.355)	-0.170 (0.412)	-0.200 (0.415)
IA			0.796*** (0.203)	0.605*** (0.203)	0.533* (0.285)	0.450 (0.298)	0.978*** (0.297)	0.754** (0.321)
Altruistic			0.527** (0.216)	0.560*** (0.210)	0.385 (0.302)	0.400 (0.312)	0.629** (0.312)	0.614* (0.316)
Treat x IA			-0.662** (0.295)	-0.570** (0.288)	-0.695* (0.386)	-0.817** (0.383)	-0.356 (0.464)	-0.241 (0.469)
Treat x Altruistic			-0.313 (0.309)	-0.376 (0.297)	-0.387 (0.402)	-0.562 (0.389)	-0.098 (0.480)	0.003 (0.486)
Constant	5.026*** (0.065)	4.044*** (0.655)	4.457*** (0.186)	3.569*** (0.662)	4.857*** (0.267)	3.538*** (0.827)	4.140*** (0.258)	3.835*** (1.314)
Beliefs	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Socio-demographics	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Education	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Occupation	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Preference measures	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Wealth bracket dummies & financial assets	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
p-value(Ho: Treat x IA $\geq$ 0)			0.013	0.024	0.036	0.017	0.221	0.304
R ²	0.004	0.139	0.023	0.150	0.013	0.167	0.046	0.197
Observations	1031	1030	1031	1030	558	557	422	422

Note: OLS regression. The dependent variable is the preference for improving the situation of the less well off using a 7-point Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) for the full sample (columns 1-4), for subjects with an income below the median (columns 5-6), and for subjects with an income above the median (columns 7-8). Subjects who did not disclose their income are not included in columns 5-8. Beliefs include subjects' prior beliefs about the income share of the top 1%, their prior beliefs about income and wealth distributions in Switzerland, as well as their beliefs about the determinants of success, financial mobility, poverty in Switzerland, and distrust in politicians. Socio-demographics include age, age squared, a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent is male, a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent's native language is French, and a dummy indicating whether the respondent is married. Education includes dummies indicating a respondent's highest educational achievement (compulsory school, vocational training, high school, university, or other). Occupation includes dummies indicating a respondent's occupation status (currently has a full-time job, a part-time job, is a student, is a pensioner, is unemployed, or other), and a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent has experienced unemployment in the past. Preference measures from the global preference survey (Falk et al., 2022) include measures of risk aversion, (positive and negative) reciprocity, impatience, and general trust in strangers. Wealth bracket dummies and financial assets include dummy variables for each wealth level, and a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent has invested part of her wealth in financial assets. For a detailed explanation of the covariates, see Appendix B.1. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. p-value(Ho: Treat $\times$ IA $\geq$ 0) indicates the p-value associated with a one-sided test evaluating the null hypothesis that the information intervention has a non-negative effect for the inequality averse subjects. Levels of significance:

* $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

E Theoretical considerations

In this Appendix, we reproduce the model we developed and discussed in Fehr (2019) (forthcoming) which integrates social preferences into a stylized model of the demand for redistribution.

To keep things simple, we assume – like in the classic paper by Meltzer and Richard (1981) – a proportional tax τ ($0 \leq \tau \leq 1$) on individuals' gross income y_i that is redistributed lump-sum via a transfer T to everybody. Tax collection and redistribution involves a quadratic redistribution cost of $\frac{1}{2}\tau^2$ per unit of gross income. Consumption c_i of individual i is given by

$$c_i = (1 - \tau)y_i + T \quad (1)$$

and the government's budget is balanced if the lump-sum transfer is given by

$$T = \left(\tau - \frac{1}{2}\tau^2 \right) \bar{y} \quad (2)$$

where $\bar{y} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n y_i$ denotes the average gross income in the population. To examine the role of social preferences we assume that individuals' preferences are given by a utility function inspired by Fehr and Schmidt (1999):

$$V_i = c_i - \alpha_i \frac{1}{n-1} \sum_{j \neq i} \max(c_j - c_i, 0) - \beta_i \frac{1}{n-1} \sum_{j \neq i} \max(c_i - c_j, 0). \quad (3)$$

V_i denotes individual i 's utility, α_i is a measure of aversion against disadvantageous inequality ($c_j - c_i > 0$) and β_i measures the aversion against advantageous inequality or a willingness to help those who are worse off ($c_i - c_j > 0$). For simplicity, we assume that individuals compare themselves to all other members of the population, i.e., n comprises the population of the polity.

The three distinct types of individuals identified in our population can be nicely captured with the help of equation (4). The selfish type is characterized by $\alpha_i = \beta_i = 0$. The inequality averse type is captured by $\alpha_i > 0$ and $\beta_i > 0$, and the altruistic type is characterized by $\alpha_i = 0$ and $\beta_i > 0$.


On the basis of the above assumptions – linear tax, lump-sum transfers to everybody, quadratic redistribution costs, no other taxes and public expenditures, balanced budget, etc. – it becomes immediately clear that the model does not apply directly to the 99% initiative. Note also that the model restricts the motivational forces for the demand for redistribution just to two factors – self-interest and social preferences. Nevertheless, we believe that the model can provide valuable intuitions about the potential role of social preferences in the demand for redistribution.

The first-order condition for an individual's demand for redistribution in terms of the preferred redistributive tax τ_i^* is:

$$\tau_i^* = 1 - \frac{1}{\bar{y}} \left(y_i - \alpha_i \frac{1}{n-1} \sum_{j \neq i} \max(y_j - y_i, 0) - \beta_i \frac{1}{n-1} \sum_{j \neq i} \max(y_i - y_j, 0) \right) \quad (4)$$

In the Figure E.1 below, we illustrate the role of social preferences in the demand for redistribution by depicting the demand for each preference type separately.

Figure E.1: Illustrating the theoretical role of social preferences



Note: The figure shows the preferred redistributive tax τ_i^* as a function of gross income for (i) selfish individuals ($\alpha_i = \beta_i = 0$), (ii) inequality averse individuals ($\alpha_i > 0, \beta_i > 0$), and (iii) altruistic individuals ($\alpha_i = 0, \beta_i > 0$). The figure is based on the current distribution of income in Switzerland.

The model implies that selfish individuals' ($\alpha_i = \beta_i = 0$) demand for redistribution falls with their gross income y_i . At very low incomes ($y_i \approx 0$) selfish individuals demand a tax rate of almost 100% while at incomes above $\bar{y}$ their demand is zero. Except at very low incomes ($y_i \approx 0$), individuals with social preferences have a higher demand for redistribution because of $\alpha_i > 0$ and/or $\beta_i > 0$.

For individuals with low incomes it is mainly the distaste against disadvantageous inequality ($\alpha_i > 0$) that increases their demand for redistribution because for most income comparisons they face disadvantageous inequality. In contrast, for individuals with high incomes it is mainly their willingness to mitigate advantageous inequality (i.e., their β_i -parameter) that increases their demand for redistribution because in most income comparisons they face advantageous inequality. Taken together, social preferences thus mitigate the decline in τ_i^* that is predicted for selfish individuals.

Note also that because selfish individuals with low incomes already demand very high levels of redistribution the model suggests that the potential impact of social preferences at low incomes levels is limited while at high income levels the scope for a role of social preferences is higher. Finally, because $\alpha_i > 0$ for inequality averse individuals while $\alpha_i = 0$ for the altruistic type, inequality averse individuals have, *ceteris paribus*, a stronger preference for redistribution in this simple model. However, since aversion against disadvantageous inequality ($\alpha_i > 0$) is particularly relevant at lower income levels, where even selfish individuals have a high demand for redistribution, it may be difficult to detect the differential impact of different types of social preferences on the demand for redistribution empirically.

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